Translating Lessons from Deepwater Horizon Spill into Better Response and Restoration

In the hours immediately after the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) rig was reported, the scope of the disaster was not known.  Even after the DWH sank, the extent of the leak(s) could not be determined because of the extreme depth and turbidity in the water caused when the mile of drill pipe and the 33,000 ton rig hit the silty sea floor.  Within hours of the first announcement that no leaks had been detected yet by the ROVs, the risk communications problems started because the limited extent of the examination was not stressed (i.e., only the blowout preventer had been examined).  When the leaks were detected as the ROVs moved further down the drill pipe, the skepticism and mistrust began.  These issues would only continue with poor estimates of the amount of oil being released, the rapid and very public failures of containment efforts, and the unprecedented use of large quantities of dispersants.  This presentation will examine how the response to the DWH spill evolved with respect to implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS) which is frequently practiced as mandated by law in the U.S.  It will also explore how state and federal politics, the injection of state-of-art marine science in a “spill of opportunity” mode, and the desire for 24/7 information of the spill and its impacts overtook the ICS and complicated the response.  Accidents, such as the DWH, are a reality of human fallibility and even the best technology cannot insure this will be the last major oil U.S. spill, especially as oil and gas reserves are tapped in ever more complex and risky deepwater and Arctic environments.  The presentation will include a discussion of the R&D needed on the scientific, engineering, economic, sociologic and political aspects of spill response to minimize the mistrust and miscommunication during future spills.  It will also stress the need to familiarize the public with the concepts of response tradeoffs and the “least bad option” rather than the naïve belief in a single “best solution” that will provide eliminate the environmental damage of oil spills when they occur.