Cultural Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation: An Introduction

Following contemporary evolutionary models, cooperation is the central organizing principle of human societies and is necessary for the construction of larger and more complex social institutions.  Yet the archaeological record of cultural evolution, which includes the physical remains attesting to the emergence of social complexity and the material symbols that past peoples used to identify themselves as cooperative or antagonistic, has infrequently been incorporated into this broader, interdisciplinary discussion.  Conversely, archaeologists have just begun any serious consideration of the dynamics of large-scale cooperative undertakings that bring mutual gains to the group, but in which any single individual would fare better by not participating while reaping the derived benefits (a "free-rider" dilemma or "tragedy of the commons").  In this paper I suggest a framework for integrating theoretical and experimental work on cooperation with the diachronic record of cultural evolution in human societies.  Archaeological perspectives on cooperation may focus on non or less coercive social mechanisms in smaller scale societies, or within factions which operated largely independently from the political institutions of larger ones—such as economic guilds and social castes within early states and empires.  Three central themes for investigating the cultural evolutionary dynamics of cooperation are the resource problems that humans grapple with, the creation and maintenance of social norms and institutions, and the materiality of mutual monitoring and signaling within and between groups.